

CIA/ONE/STAFF MEM/28-64 ANOTHER TITO IN THE BALKANS?

SECRET MAY 64

01 OF 01

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

S-E-C-R-E-T

Approved For Release 2004/08/04 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210014-8

CIA/ONE/STAFF MEM/28-64 (839)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

27 May 1964

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 28-64: (Internal ONE Distribution Only)

SUBJECT: Another Tito in the Balkans?

1. Rumanian defiance of Moscow has now gone to the point where the Rumanian leaders are following an independent line not only in domestic affairs, but increasingly in foreign policy as well. We submit that their position for most practical purposes is a Titoist one. By this we do not mean that the Rumanian leaders are about to mould their internal program in the likeness of Belgrade's. Indeed, there does not appear to be an immediate prospect of a significant relaxation of political control. But in terms of relations with the other Communist states and with the West, their behavior is that of an independent Communist state, similar in many respects to that of Yugoslavia.

2. Rumania has been behaving like a non-Satellite for some time now. We observed last year that success in getting Moscow to back down and acquiesce in Rumania's national development plans

State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1

S-E-C-R-E-T

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

Approved For Release 2004/08/04 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210014-8

would only encourage the Rumanians to act more boldly.* Since then their behavior has become more and more nationalistic. They have taken additional measures to curb Russian cultural and political influence within Rumania. They have publicly thumbed their noses at the Russians in the UN and in UN Committees. They have refused to go along with the Soviets in the vital matter of support against China, and have even been presumptuous enough to offer to mediate the conflict. Using long-established Balkan bargaining tactics, they have tread delicate middle ground between the Soviets and the Chinese,,and between the Soviets and the West, attempting to extract benefits from all. Recently, they have gone so far as to issue a formal declaration of political and economic independence within the Communist world, following it up with a systematic publicity campaign within Rumania which has taken a vehemently nationalistic and anti-Soviet turn. The keynote was struck with the declaration of 27 April on the "Rumanian Road", which said:

"Bearing in mind the diversity of the conditions of socialist construction, there are not and there can be no unique patterns and recipes; no one can decide what is and what is not correct for other countries or parties. It is up to every Marxist-Leninist party, it is a sovereign right of each socialist state, to elaborate, choose, or change the forms and methods of socialist construction."

* Staff Memorandum No. 34-63: "Rumanian Defiance of Moscow," dated 5 June 1963.

3. In their relations with the USSR the Rumanians have taken advantage of the fact that the Soviets have long encouraged a new concept of relations, stressing autonomy, sovereignty and equal rights. The Soviets were using this approach to gain Satellite adherence to a new, more sophisticated form of Soviet control, and they did not, of course, mean that their proclamations should be taken too literally. The new form of control was meant to rely largely on willing adherence by kindred-spirit Communist leaders (e.g., Gomulka and Kadar) to Soviet leadership in key aspects of policy.

4. We know now that the decision in 1956 to crush the Hungarian uprising was reached only after the greatest agonizing by the Soviet leaders, and under strong pressure by the Chinese. The intervention saved the fabric of the Bloc for the time being, but it also did the Soviets great political harm. If a situation occurred again in Eastern Europe akin to that of Hungary in 1956, the Soviets would probably agonize again. If Communist power were about to be overthrown, they would probably decide to intervene -- though this is by no means a certainty, as indeed it was not at the time of Hungary.

- 3 -

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

S-E-C-R-E-T

5. But whether or not they so decided, we think they would not even consider it unless the circumstances were extreme. And short of this they have few remaining sanctions which are effective anymore, whether these are economic, political or psychological. Most of these countries by now have been encouraged by the Soviets to develop their own structures of control. It is true that the Soviets still have some advisors and agents in these countries, -- but they are no longer able to use the Satellite security services as an important arm of Soviet control. In fact, the Soviets have to tread warily in this sphere for fear of causing strong adverse reaction by the Satellite leaders, whose cooperation is important to them. In Albania, unsuccessful Soviet attempts to subvert the leadership actually served to strengthen the position of the latter.

6. There are a number of similarities between the present Rumanian-Soviet relationship and the Yugoslav-Soviet relationship in 1947-48. There is, first of all, the refusal of the lesser party in each case to submit its internal program to central control by the Bloc. There is also a certain similarity in the makeup of the leadership elements. Both Tito and Gheorghiu-Dej were of the "nativist" variety of Communist -- which is to say that neither of them spent the war outside the country and returned on the coat-tails of the Red Army. The "Muscovites" in the

- 4 -

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

S-E-C-R-E-T

Rumanian party (including Ana Pauker); were purged in the early fifties. Subsequently, the Rumanian leadership has had a certain resemblance to Tito's leadership group in that it consists of a tight group of cronies who have shared both success and adversity and have long worked closely together. However, while Tito's bete noire was Stalin, Gheorghiu-Dej's has been Khrushchev. Hostility between the two dates back at least to the first pressures to de-Stalinize in 1956. Later, when faced with Soviet pressure to conform, Dej's action was akin to Tito's in that he used nationalism and the cry of Soviet intervention to strengthen his control over this own party.

7. Even before their expulsion from the Cominform the Yugoslavs took measures to reduce Soviet cultural and political influence in their country. The Rumanians in the past two years have reduced Soviet informational and cultural activity, and have virtually eliminated obligatory teaching of the Russian language at all levels of education. The history of the Rumanian party, including the latter's role in the "liberation" of Rumania, has been rewritten to make the latter appear as the champion of Rumanian nationalism against the sinister machinations of Moscow. Stress is now being placed on the Roman origins of the Rumanian language.

- 5 -

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET

8. There may even be some parallel on the score of attempted Soviet subversion. The Soviets tried it in Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslavs effectively countered, first by measures to curb Soviet influence in the security apparatus, then by countermeasures against Soviet intelligence activities, and finally by ouster of pro-Soviet types in the top leadership. A recent report (unconfirmed)

25X1A

[redacted] suggests that the Rumanians may have discovered Soviet infiltration of the security services, and have taken steps to thwart it.* We do not yet know whether the Soviets have recently tried to subvert the Rumanian leadership, but we would not be surprised if they did. Another report received

25X1A

[redacted] suggests that this may have happened -- and if so, that it backfired.

9. The Rumanian party leadership has carried out an extensive campaign to publicize the Rumanian Declaration of 27 April, and according to the reports this campaign has been strongly anti-Soviet in character. To be sure, it is curious that so many reports should have been received [redacted] just at the time when a high level

25X1A

25X1A

* [redacted] Lt. Gen. Gheorghe Pintihe, a former Soviet citizen and NKVD official was removed from his post last year as head of the Securitate (Rumanian secret police), and that other Securitate officials were reportedly purged.

Rumanian delegation was in Washington to discuss the full range of US-Rumanian relations, [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

[REDACTED] we see no reason to question either the existence of the campaign or its anti-Soviet slant.

10. This may indeed be no more than a natural development in relation to the evolution of events in Rumanian-Soviet relations. Last year, when the Rumanian declaration on CEMA was being discussed in party organizations throughout the country, there was a good deal of indignant discussion of previous Soviet economic exploitation of Rumania. Khrushchev's attempts to exert pressure on the Rumanians to alter their course had caused some resentment in the Rumanian leadership, and it perhaps is not surprising that the present campaign also should take an anti-Khrushchev turn. Moreover, the recent declaration itself plays on nationalist feelings by speaking of past Soviet interference in the Rumanian party.

11. However, we think it is also possible that this is not sufficient explanation, and that some recent event in Soviet-Rumanian relations has worsened matters considerably. We would speculate, as above, that the Soviets may have tried unsuccessfully to unseat Gheorghiu-Dej, or that they made some sort of threat or tried to exert pressure, which only inflamed Rumanian national

- 7 -

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

S-E-C-R-E-T

pride. Khrushchev may even have indulged in one of his characteristic splenetic outbursts against Maurer when the latter stopped in at Gagra on his way home from Peiping.

Some Implications

12. Whether or not they have been stimulated by some Soviet action, the Rumanians seem to be well on their way to establishing yet another form of national Communism, a development which is of considerable significance for the Soviet position and Soviet power in Eastern Europe.

13. Since the Rumanian position has taken shape gradually, however, we would not expect immediate and radical changes from the trends already established unless the Soviets were to attempt some action which, as has already been suggested, would stimulate Rumanian opposition in a major way. We would expect that Rumanian relations with CEMA will continue to worsen and that ties with this organization will grow increasingly thin. We think problems in relations with Bloc organizations probably will be reflected eventually in military relations with the Warsaw Pact. It is possible, though we have no convincing evidence, that something has already occurred in this sphere.

14. Internally we would expect a process of gradual internal change toward less restrictive and doctrinaire policies. The domestic program probably will acquire more and more uniquely Rumanian characteristics. Greater confidence of the Rumanian leaders towards their populace (particularly because of support on the national issue) may lead eventually to amelioration of local policies. We may have been witnessing the beginnings of this in recent and impending releases of political prisoners. But we would not expect drastic changes to occur soon in the domestic sphere. After all, for some time after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform, Tito remained more leftist than the other Communist states. His heresy took time to develop -- and this may also be the case in Rumania.

15. Relations with the Yigoslavs probably will improve considerably, as these two countries come to have more and more in common in terms of their attitude toward relations between the Communist states.* Indeed, the existence of yet another independent Communist country in the Balkans will be a powerful additional

* There is also a certain bond in the identification of each as an underdeveloped country, and therefore a common interest with other underdeveloped countries. The Rumanians made this point at the recent session of UNCTAD. Such an approach would also tend to produce antagonism toward institutional ties with the Bloc.

stimulus to the others to do likewise. To be sure, many of these countries have their own reasons at present for wanting or not wanting to act independently. But in the future as issues arise in which their interests are at odds with the USSR, we may see further manifestations of national Communism among these countries -- even by some of them who now seem most loyal to Moscow.



25X1A

- 10 -

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
S-E-C-R-E-T